Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1959

George Popp v. Arie Peter Roth and Gerarda Roth :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
William G. Fowler; Counsel for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Popp v. Roth, No. 8955 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3204

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

FILED
2 -1959
F~B

-······---~---···································.
Jerk, Supreme Court,. iit~h···-

GEORGE POPP '

Plainti/J and Appellant,

vs.
ARIE PETER ROTH and GERARDA
ROTH, his wife,

Case
No. 8956
)

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

WILLIAM G. FOWLER
Counsel for Appellant
628 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
STATEMENT OF POINTS .............................. 10
ARGUMENT
POINT I. AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF RIGHTFULLY AND LAWFULLY IS ENTITLED TO THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD, LORE POPP, AND THE
CHILD PRESENTLY IS ILLEGALLY AND UNLAWFULLY
RESTRAINED BY THE DEFENDANTS ................... 11
A. THE CHILD, LORE POPP, COULD NOT LAWFULLY
BE ADOPTED BY THE DEFENDANTS WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF PLAINTIFF, AND HAVING FAILED TO
SECURE SAID CONSENT THE CUSTODY OF THE
DEFENDANTS MUST BE DEEMED UNLAWFUL AND
WITHOUT RIGHT ................................. 12
B. THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE
SECOND MARRIAGE OF PLAINTIFF TO WINIFRED
POPP AS A MATTER OF LAW HAS NOT BEEN REBUTTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
OF INVALIDITY .................................. 13
i) THE STATUS AND VALIDITY OF A MARRIAGE
CONTRACT AND THE STATUS OF LEGITIMACY
OF OFFSPRING MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE
LAW OF ILLINOIS, THE DOMICILIARY STATE .. 15
ii) A VALID MARRIAGE AND LEGITIMACY HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE LAWS OF ONE
STATE, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED BY ALL
STATES ....................................... 16
C. ASSUMING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF PLAINTIFF
TO WINIFRED POPP WAS CONTRACTED AT PEORIA,
ILLINOIS, DURING THE INTERLOCUTORY PERIOD
OF A PRE-EXISTING GERMAN DECREE OF DIVORCE, THE MARRIAGE NONETHELESS WAS
VALID AND LAWFUL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
D. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO ONLY, THAT THE
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY THE PARTIES IN
ILLINOIS WAS VOID, THE STATUS OF THE MINOR
CHILD IS LEGITIMATE WTHIN THE MEANNGS OF
ILLINOIS STATUTES AND BY REASON OF PUBLIC
POLICY .......................................... 23
POINT II. AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF IS A FIT
AND PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE CONTROL AND
CUSTODY OF HIS MINOR CHILD, LORE POPP.. . . . . . . . . . 24
CONCLUSION ......................................... 26
AUTHORITIES CITED
Anderson v. Anderson, 121 Utah 237, 240 P. 2d 966, 967 .. 14-15
Baldwin v. Nielson (Utah, 1946) 174 P. 2d 437 ............ 26
Bauer v. Abrahams, 73 Colo. 509, 216 Pac. 259 . . . . . . . . . . 19-20
In re Biersack, 96 Misc. 161, 159 NYS 519, affd 179
App. Div. 916, 165 NYS 1077 ...................... 14
Bowman v. Little, 101 Md. 273, 61 A. 223 .................. 14
Boyles v. Wallace, 208 Ala. 213 93 So. 908 ............... 20
Craddock's Case, 310 Mass. 116, 37 N.E. 2d 508, 146 A.L.R.
116 .............................................. 15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Criss v. Industrial Commission, 348 Ill. 75, 180 N.E. 572 .. 19-21
Dimpfel v. Wilson, 107 Md. 329, 68 Atl. 561. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N.Y. 313, 165 N.E. 460, 61 A.L.R. 1523. 20
Fowler v. Texas Exploration Co., Tex. 1926, 290 S.W. 818. 14
Goodwin v. Goodwin (N.Y.) 142 N.Y.· Supp. 110.2 .... -..... 19
Green v. McDowell, 210 Mo. App. 517, 242 S.W. 168 ........ 19
Harvey v. Oklahoma (Okla., 1925) 298 Pac. 862, 51 A.L.R.
321 ............................................. 19
Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S.E. 316, 32 A.L.R.
10.88 ............................................ 16
Hoagland v. Hoagland, 27 Wyo. 178, 193 Pac. 843, 32
A.L.R. 1104 ...................................... 16
Kowalski v. Wojtowski, 19 N.J. 247, 116 A. 2d 6, 53
A.L.R. 2d 556 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Kolombatovich v. Magma Copper Co., 43 Ariz. 314, 30 P. 2d
832 .............................................. 15
Matthews v. Jones (1945, CA 5th Cir.) 149 F. 2d 893 ........ 15
Miller v, Pennington, 288 Ill. 220, 75 N.E. 919) ............ 17
Mund v. Rehaume, 51 Colo. 129, 117 Pac. 159; .......... 16
Owen vs. Owen, 178 Wise. 609, 190 N.W. 363 .............. 19
Owen v. Owen, 127 Colo. 359, 257 P. 2d 581; 43 A.L.R. 2d 1081 16
Packard v. Packard (Iowa 1950) 45 N.W. 2d 269 ......... 19
In Re Estate of Panico (1932) 268 Ill. App. 585 . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
In re Panico (1932) 268 Ill. App. 585 .................... 15
People v. Woodley, 22 Cal. App. 674, 136 Pac. 312 ........ 19-20
Pickard v. Pickard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
In re Pilcher's Estate, 114 Utah 72, 197 P.2d 143. . . . . . . . 14, 15
Plummer v. Davis (Okla.) 36 P.2d 938 .................... 20
In Re Sanders Estate (Calif., 1957) 305 P. 2d 655 ...... 15, 19, 20
Scott v. Scott, 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W. 2d 627, 23 A.L.R.
2d 1432 ......................................... 15
Sherry v. Doyle, 68 Utah 74, 249 Pac. 250, 48 A.L.R. 131 .. 25
State v. Rocker, 130 Iowa 239, 107 N.W. 645 ............. 14
Tompkins v. Commonwealth, 117 Ky. 138, 77 S.W. 712 ...... 14
VanVoorhis v. Brinthall, 86 N.Y. 18, 40 Am. Rep. 505 ...... 22
Walton v. Coffman (Utah, 1946) 169 P.2d 97 .............. 26
Welch v. All Persons, 78 Mont. 370, 254 Pac. 179 .......... 14
Wheelock v. Freiwald (8th Cir.) 66 F. 2d 694, 700 .......... 21
Winter v. Dubble, 251 Ill. 200, 95 NE 1093 .............. 15
Yeats v. S. (Okla.), 236 Pac. 62 ......................... 20
TEXTS CITED
11 Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws, Sec. 17 ...................
35 Am. Jur., Marriage, Sec. 192 .........................
Annotation, 14 A.L.R. 2d 7 .......... ·...................
Annotation, 32 A.L.R. 1143 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Annotation, 51 A.L.R. 325 ..............................
15 C.J.S., Conflict of Laws, Sec. 16c ......................
15 C.J.S., Conflict of Laws, Sec. 16h ....................
26 Harvard Law Review 536 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
54 Harvard Law Review 501 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56 Harvard Law Review 624 ............................

16
14
14
19
19
15
16
22
22
24

STATUTES CITED
3, Section 163, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953 ............ 16,
89, Section 79a, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953 .............
111¥2, Sec. 48b, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 .............

24
24
17
12

Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Section

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

!e

ll.
1!

In the Supreme Court

l~

1!

1!
1!
1~

of the State of Utah

I

1~ '

"b
.11

GEORGE POPP,

)
Plaintiff and Appellant,

.. 1i

.. 1!

\

vs.

li11i

.1!

... la
... 1j
\!·!~

1

... !1
1!,1a
.. Jij
,l!,lij

... lJ
ll .. ll

... ll

... II
j;

ARIE PETER ROTH and GERARDA
ROTH, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

)

Case
No. 8956

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

;~

.... H

.... ll
... 11

.. J

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The plaintiff and appellant, George Popp, will be referred
to throughout this brief as plaintiff, and the defendants and
respondents, Arie Peter Roth and Gerarda Roth, will be referred to as defendants or by name.
This appeal arises out of a complaint for writ of habeas
corpus brought by plaintiff against defendants to determine
whether Lore Popp, the alleged minor child of plaintiff, was
illegally or unlawfully restrained by the defendants. The de3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fendants answered by denying that the minor' child was illegall~
or unlawfully restrained, and alleging that the child wa:
illegitimate and properly placed with defendants by the natura
mother for the purposes of adoption.
The trial court determined that plaintiff was not entitlec
to custody of the child, and that the custody of defendants wa~
lawful. This appeal is taken from said judgment and determi.
nation.
The trial in this matter was held on three days, to-wit:
January 14 and 15, and June 27, 1958.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant immigrated to the United States of AmeriG
from West Germany in July of 1955, and became a resident oJ
Peoria, Illinois (R. 44). The plaintiff is still a resident oJ
Peoria.
The appellant first met Winifred Fleischmann (later hi:
wife) in Germany shortly after World War II (R. 40), anc
commenced keeping company with one another socially in 195•
(R. 40-44). During the month of October, 1954, plaintif
and \V'inifred Fleischmann had sexual relations (R. 43)
\vhich, according to plaintiff, resulted in Winifred becominJ
pregnant (R. 45-46) .Winifred left Germany arriving in th
United States February 1, 1955, and became a resident o
Peoria, Illinois (R. 100). She gave birth to the minor child
Lore, at Peoria on the 15th day of June, 1955 (R. 44).
Prior to coming to the United States, plaintiff institute
divorce proceedings against the then Mrs. Popp at Nurnber!
4
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Germany, and a divorce was granted Mrs. Popp upon her
"Countercomplaint" (R. 149). A translation of the Final
Decree was received in evidence in the instant action (Exhibit
D-4) . On the basis of oral arguments before the German Court,
on June 21, 1955, the court made, inter alia, the following
"Final Decree":
"II. The marriage of the parties contracted before the
Registrar's Office Nurnberg is dissolved upon the
Countercomplaint.''
The determination of the German Court was issued June 28,
1955. Elsewhere in Exhibit D-4, the statement appears as
follows:
"II. It is hereby certified that the above Decree becomes
legally effective as of November 21, 1955."
After Winifred located a sponsor for him pursuant to
immigration requirements plaintiff left Germany for the United
States (R. 46). Plaintiff and Winifred Fleischmann were
married at Peoria, Illinois, July 23, 1955.
On the 8th day of February, 1957, plaintiff and his wife,
Winifred, made application by paternity affidavits to the State
of Illinois requesting that a certificate of birth be prepared
and filed showing the minor child, Lore, to be the legitimate
child of George C. and Winifred Popp, and have the name
"Lore Walburga Popp" (R. 184; Exhibits D-9 and D-10).
Pursuant to these applications, the State of Illinois caused a
new birth certificate to be issued and filed showing Lore to be
the legitimate daughter of George C. Popp and Winifred
Fleischmann Popp, which certificate is dated February 13,
1957 (R. 55; Exhibit P-2).

5
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The plaintiff testified that he was advised by Winifred
that he was the father of Lore (R. 46) ; that after their marriage, he and Winifred went to the Peoria County Court House
to make application to have the birth certificate changed to
reflect that he was the father of Lore ( R. 48-49) .
Plaintiff, Winifred, the child Lore, and a new daughter,
Elizabeth, continued to live together as a family until September, 1957, when Winifred told plaintiff that she wanted
to leave him (R. 49-50). Winifred left the home at Peoria
taking the child, Lore, to Salt Lake City, Utah, leaving the
younger child, Elizabeth, with plaintiff at Peoria (R. 50).
Approximately 14 days later, he received a phone call from
Winifred, who indicated that she wanted to place Lore for
adoption (R. 50-51). Plaintiff refused her request (R. 51).
During the conversation Winifred asked plaintiff, "if you have
to sign some papers, will you sign some papers" (R. 50, 111112, 124-125). Subsequendy, Winifred did not advise plaintiff
of the adoption "Because I just wasn't interested in calling
him or writing him" (R. 125).
Following the phone conversation, plaintiff next heard
from Winifred about November 1, 1957, receiving a letter
post-marked "San Francisco," advising that she and Lore were
in San Francisco (R. 51, 54, 109), and she subsequently told
plaintiff that "Lore remained in San Francisco" (R. 109).
Another letter arrived "Saturday after Christmas," (R. 51),
prompting plaintiff to see a lawyer in Peoria (R. 53). He left
for Salt Lake City, arriving January 1, 1958 (R. 53). On that
date he located Winifred, and in reply to his inquiry to Lore's
whereabouts, Winifred variously stated that Lore was in San
Francisco and Florida (R. 53, 54, 109, 110).
6
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In October, 1957, Winifred placed the child with defendants for purposes of adoption. On October 25, 1957, one
Jf the judges of the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, made and entered an order
placing said child with defendants for the purposes of adoption.
The testimony of Winifred Popp, at the adoption proceeding,
was published in this action (R. 103) and made a part of the
record (R. 16-22). She testified that plaintiff, though admittedly
married to her on July 23, 1955, was not the father of the
child (R. 17). Winifred executed her consent to the adoption
before the court (R. 18). Upon the basis of Winifred's
testimony the court, in the adoption proceeding, made the
following remarks:
"THE COURT: As the Court sees the situation,
George C. Popp has no claim upon the child.

*

*

*

*

"The Court makes an order from the evidence now
before the Court that George C. Popp has no legal
claim upon this child and that the proceedings for the
petitioners may be held at this time.

*

*

*

*

"THE COURT: The Court also finds from the evidence that this is an illegitimate child which entitles
us to proceed without any regard to the natural father
of the child.

*

*

*

*

"THE COURT: As I view the matter and if I were
doing it, I would take the view that whatever proceedings were had in Illinois would be defective and place
upon him the burden of going forward to assert any
claim he might have and upon her testimony a decree
will be issued giving the adopting parents temporary
7
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custody for the purpose of a year to lapse and in that
connection we will make a finding that George C. Popp
has no legal claim upon' the child in this case" (R.
18, 19).
The plaintiff, admittedly, was not given notice of the
adoption proceedings, nor did he ever consent to said adoption
(R. 55).
The plaintiff testified that he came to Salt Lake City for the
express purpose of recovering custody of Lore (R. 70).
Winifred Popp did not notify plaintiff that she was placing
Lore for adoption (R. 81). She further testified that plaintiff
treated the child unfairly by putting her to bed at 5:00 o'clock
(R. 88), hitting her when she cried (R. 88, 101), by not allowing her toys (R. 89), and by leaving the children at home
without a sitter for "an hour or two" (R. 103, 118). She
testified further that "she talked to him" about his purported
cruelty to the children (R. 120), but that she did not file a
divorce or take any action against him in Illinois (R. 120).
She left the children with plaintiff five evenings a week while
she was working (R. 120). She admitted that plaintiff bought
all the groceries and they were never hungry (R. 124), and
that they lived in an apartment with a fenced yard and television (R. 89).
Plaintiff denied striking the child on the face, but stipulated to "spanking" her on the "hind end" when "she needed
a spanking " (R. 134). He conceded striking the child on one
occasion hard enough to bruise her when she climbed from
her crib and fell to the floor, to remind her of the danger
involved (R. 135). He bought the children's clothes and toys
8
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(R. 136-137). He put the children to bed at 7:00-8:00 o'clock
p.m. (R. 138). He loves Lore and wants to take the child
back to Peoria (R. 140). No one has ever complained to him
about his treatment of the children (R. 138). The plaintiff
described the physical relation of his apartment to his neighbor,
and advised that when he left the apartment while Winifred
was at work, he made certain the neighbors looked in and
kept a watch on the children, and that the neighbors could
easily hear any crying or disturbance through the thin walls
(R. 137, 142).
Lydia Fleischmann, sister of Winifred, testified on behalf
of defendant, that she had lived in the home of plaintiff and
his wife for two weeks in August, 1957, and visited their home
occasionally when she lived elsewhere in Peoria (R. 176-177);
that she saw plaintiff strike the child in the face when she was
five month old (R. 170) ; that she saw "black and blue marks"
on Lore's face when she was visiting plaintiff's home sometime in 1957 (R. 170-171); that when she was visiting with
plaintiff in August, 195 7, plaintiff went out "practically every
night" (R. 171); and that she saw him with other women
(R. 173).
Winifred Popp was recalled as a witness for defendants
at the last hearing of June 27, 1958, and in reply to questions
of counsel for defendants, stated that she was then residing
with plaintiff at Peoria and intended to reconcile (R. 185186).

9
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF RIGHTFULLY
AND LAWFULLY IS ENTITLED TO THE CUSTODY OF
THE MINOR CHILD, LORE POPP, AND THE CHILD
PRESENTLY IS ILLEGALLY AND UNLAWFULLY RE"
STRAINED BY THE DEFENDANTS.
A. THE CHILD, LORE POPP, COULD NOT LAWFULLY BE ADOPTED BY THE DEFENDANTS
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF PLAINTIFF, AND
HAVING FAILED TO SECURE SAID CONSENT
THE CUSTODY OF THE DEFENDANTS MUST
BE DEEMED UNLAWFUL AND WITHOUT
RIGHT.
B. THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE
SECOND MARRIAGE OF PLAINTIFF TO WINIFRED POPP AS A MATTER OF LAW HAS NOT
BEEN REBUTTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF INVALIDITY.

i) THE STATUS AND VALIDITY OF A MARRIAGE CONTRACT AND THE STATUS OF
LEGITIMACY OF OFFSPRING MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE LAW OF ILLINOIS, THE
DOMICILIARY STATE.
ii) A VALID MARRIAGE AND LEGITIMACY
HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE LAWS
OF ONE STATE, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED
BY ALL STATES.
10
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C. ASSUMING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF PLAINTIFF TO \VINIFRED POPP WAS CONTRACTED
AT PEORIA, ILLINOIS, DURING THE INTERLOCUTORY PERIOD OF A PRE-EXISTING GERMAN DECREE OF DIVORCE, THE MARRIAGE
NONETHELESS WAS VALID AND LAWFUL.
D. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO ONLY, THAT
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY THE PARTIES IN ILLINOIS WAS VOID, THE STATUS OF
THE MINOR CHILD IS LEGITIMATE WITHIN
THE MEANINGS OF ILLINOIS STATUTES AND
BY REASON OF PUBLIC POLICY.
POINT II
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF IS A FIT AND
PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE CONTROL AND CUSTODY OF HIS MINOR CHILD, LORE POPP.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF RIGHTFULLY
AND LAWFULLY IS ENTITLED TO THE CUSTODY OF
THE !vfiNOR CHILD, LORE POPP, AND THE CHILD
PRESENTLY IS ILLEGALLY AND UNLAWFULLY RESTRAINED BY THE DEFENDANTS.
A. THE CHILD, LORE POPP, COULD NOT LAWFULLY BE ADOPTED BY THE DEFENDANTS
11
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WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF PLAINTIFF, AND
HAVING FAILED TO SECURE SAID CONSENT
THE CUSTODY OF THE DEFENDANTS MUST
BE DEEMED UNLAWFUL AND WITHOUT
RIGHT.
The evidence is clear to the effect that adoption proceedings were commenced in the Third Judicial District Court for
Salt Lake County, and that an order was made granting
custody of Lore Popp to the defendants (See transcript of
proceedings, dated October 23, 1957, R.16-22). Likewise, it
is apparent that no consent was executed or given by plaintiff
to the proceedings placing the child, Lore, for adoption.
Indeed, the court observed that the child was "illegitimate"
and that plaintiff herein "has no legal claim upon this child"
(R. 19). And, this conclusion was reached by the court upon
the basis of Winifred's testimony that she had not married
the natural father (R. 17}, although a finding was made by that
court that Winifred was married to plaintiff (R. 143). At no
time in the adoption proceeding was the court concerned that
plaintiff herein might have been, in fact, the natural father,
to warrant giving notice or securing his consent to the adoption.
This cavalier action constituted a real and awesome judicial
abrogation of personal rights.
Defendants are holding the child, Lore, in their custody
under color of right having its basis in the adoption proceedings. It is submitted that the order placing the child for
adoption is a sham and not in compliance with the law.
Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. provides
that a "legitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent
12
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of the parents, if living * * * ." Our entire problem revolves
around the word "legitimate," for if the child, Lore, is legitimate, as that term is used in our statute, the action of the court
in placing the child patently was unlawful.
Plaintiff contends that the child was legitimated by a
subsequent marriage of the parents, that the plaintiff acknowledged the child as his, and that he took the child into
his home and treated her as his lawful child. The competent
evidence shows that plaintiff and Winifred entered into a
marriage considered lawful in Illinois. The plaintiff and
Winifred made application, pursuant to Illinois law, to change
the birth records of the child to reflect them to be the parents,
and thereby legitimate the child. This action, it is submitted,
was sufficient to legitimate the child so as to require plaintiff's
consent to an adoption.
Succinctly stated, defendants contend that the second
marriage can be attacked collaterally, that the second marriage
was absolutely void, and, that the child is illegitimate, notwithstanding the efforts made or that might be made by the
plaintiff and his wife to legitimate the child. It is concluded
by defendants that the child is "illegitimate" as that term is
used in our statute, supra, to obviate plaintiff's consent.
B. THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE
SECOND MARRIAGE OF PLAINTIFF TO WINIFRED POPP AS A MATTER OF LAW HAS NOT
BEEN REBUTTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF INVALIDITY.
The presumption in favor of validity of a second marriage

u
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is one of the strongest presumptions known to the law (35
Am. Jur., Marriage, Sec. 192), and this is especially so where
the legitimacy of children is attacked (see annotation, 14
A.L.R. 2d 7). As stated in Anderson v. Anderson, ( 121 Utah
237, 240 P. 2d 966, 967):

" * * * the presumption of validity of the second
marriage 'is one of the strongest disputable presumptions known in law' " (citing In re Pilcher's Estate, 114
Utah 72, 197 P. 2d 143).
In Re Biersack, 96 Misc. 161, 159 NYS 519, affirmed
179 App. Div. 916, 165 NYS 1077, where the legitimacy of
a child depended upon the validity of a second marriage it
was held that the presumption is in favor of legitimacy, as
well as the marriage, and that it would prevail unless the
rebutting evidence was clear and irrefragable proof of every
element of fact necessary to defeat the presumption. The
decision further pointed out that the evidence must not only
establish the fact and validity of the earlier marriage, bui
exclude every basis which might conceivably rescue the second
marriage from invalidity (see also Welch v. All Persons, 78
Mont. 370, 254 Pac. 179; Tompkins v. Commonwealth, 117
Ky. 138, 77 S.W. 712; Fowler v. Texas Exploration Co., (Tex.
1926) 290 S.W. 818; State v. Rocker, 130 Iowa 239, 107 N.W.
645; Bowman v. Little, 101 Md. 273, 61 A. 223).
Where the fact of a second marriage is shown, the subsequent marriage is sufficient to raise the presumption that
the first marriage was terminated by divorce. For reasons of
applicability of the doctrines of conflicts of law, as will be
pointed out below, the courts of Illinois have applied this
14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

presumption (See Matthews v. Jones ( 1945, CA 5th Cir.)
149 F. 2d 893; Re Estate of Panico (1932) 268 Ill. App. 585;
Winter v. Dubble, 251 Ill. 200, 95 NE 1093; See also Re
Pilcher's Estate, supra).
The plaintiff is quite willing to agree that the presumption
in favor of the second marriage is not conclusive to the point
that plenary proof is necessary. The rebuttal evidence must,
however, be sufficiently clear and conclusive as fairly to preclude any other result (Kolombatovich v. Magma Copper Co.,
43 Ariz. 314, 30 P. 2d 832). As stated by this Honorzble
Court in Anderson v. Anderson, supra, the evidence must be
"clear and convincing" (at 968).
i) THE STATUS AND VALIDITY OF A MARRIAGE CONTRACT AND THE STATUS OF
LEGITIMACY OF OFFSPRING MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE LAW OF ILLINOIS, THE
DOMICILIARY STATE.
For our purposes here, we must examine the validity of
plaintiff's second marriage and the legitimacy of the child,
Lore, by the law of Illinois. The marriage was performed and
consummated at Peoria, Illinois; the child was born there;
and, the family resided there at all times material hereto.
The validity of a marriage must be determined by the law
of the place where it is entered into ( 15 C.J.S., Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 16C; In re Sanders Estate (Calif., 1957) 305 P.
2d 655; Craddock's Case, 310 Mass. 116, 37 N.E. 2d 508,
146 A.L.R. 116; Scott v. Scott, 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W. 2d
627, 23 A.L.R. 2d 1431; Owen v. Owen, 127 Colo. 359, 257
15
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P. 2d 581; 43 A.L.R. 2d 1081). Moreover, a marriage valid
where consummated is valid everywhere (HeRinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 11.8 S.E. 316, 32 A.L.R. 1088; Hoagland
v. Hoagland, 27 Wyo. 178, 193 Pac. 843, 32 A.L.R. 1104).
By the same token, the laws of the state of domicile of
the father, mother, and child fixes the legitimacy of the child
(Kowalski v. Wojtowski, 19 N.J. 247, 116 A. 2d 6, 53 A.L.R.
2d 556). Once legitimated under the laws of the domicil, this
status is retained through life by the child wherever it may
go (11 Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws, Sec. 17, citing Mund v.
Rehaume, 51 Colo. 129, 117 Pac. 159; 15 C.J.S .. Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 16 h.)
ii) A VALID MARRIAGE AND LEGITIMACY
HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE LAWS
OF ONE STATE, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED
BY ALL STATES.
It must be assumed that plaintiff and Winifred Popp
entered into a marriage lawful in form and ceremony, and
did comply with the laws of the State of Illinois. It might be
noted again that the court in the adoption proceedings made a
finding that the marriage had been consummated. The testimony of plaintiff, coupled with documentary evidence received
at the trial, establish this fact beyond doubt. Chapter 3. Section
163, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953, provides, in this regard:

·'An illegitimate child whose parents intermarry and
is acknowledged by the father as the father's child shall
be considered legitimate.''
Assuming then, no other disabling factor, the marriage
16
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performed in Illinois was sufficient to cloak the child, Lore,
with the respectability of legitimacy, and having attached can
not be undone (see also Miller v. Pennington, 218 Ill. 220,
75 N.E. 919).
A certified copy of the birth certificate of the child was
received in evidence (Exhibit P-2) designating plaintiff and
Winifred Popp as the parents of Lore, which certificate was
granted after compliance with Illinois law requiring documentary evidence of paternity and marriage (Exhibits D-9
and D-10), and which certificate is issued "in the same form
as certificate of birth for a legitimate child" (Chapter 111 Yz,
Sec. 48b, Ill. Rev. Stat., 195 3). By issuing this certificate in
compliance with Illinois statutes the child is treated as legitimate, and it must be presumed that such action was taken in
accordance with law.
C. ASSUMING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF PLAINTIFF TO WINIFRED POPP WAS CONTRACTED
AT PEORIA, ILLINOIS, DURING THE INTERLOCUTORY PERIOD OF A PRE-EXISTING GERMAN DECREE OF DIVORCE, THE MARRIAGE
NONETHELESS WAS VALID AND LAWFUL.
Although the marriage consummated at Peoria, Illinois,
by plaintiff and Winifred Popp, has every apparent advantage
of legality, still it has been contended that the decree of the
German Court should be construed so as to treat it as void.
This effort is made in order to convert a child, legitimate by
the law of Illinois, into an illegitimate child to justify the
purposes of the adoption proceeding. This action smacks of
17
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unfairness and is destructive of the sanctity of marriage and
family.
The German Decree has two statements which have a
material bearing upon the dissolution of the prior marriage,
as follows:
"II. The marriage of the parties contracted before the
Registrar's Office Nurnberg is dissolved upon the
Countercomplaint. (Emphasis supplied.)

*

*

*

*

"II. It is hereby certified that the above Decree becomes
legally effective as of November 21, 1955."
Significantly, the former provision bearing the date, June
28, 1955, clearly purports to dissolve the marriage, whereas
the latter provision postpones the effective date of the dissolution for reasons unknown. The latter provision is not
unlike interlocutory proscriptions on remarriage common to
many states of the United States. But, this is not to say that
such proscriptions delay the dissolution of the marriage.
In the absence of continental authorities upon the extraterritorial effect of such a restraint on remarriage, the situation
is best compared with construction of such a restraint by our
own courts.
Our situation can be compared with a divorce granted in
one state containing a prohibition against remarriage or a
statement postponing the effective date of the decree during a
prescribed period of time, and where one of the parties moves
to another state and remarries while the proscription is extant.
It is of significance that the party usually changes his domicile
18
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to the second state and does not go there for the express purpose
of evading the marriage restraint imposed by the first state.
As a general proposition it uniformly is held that a
marriage is valid according to the law of the place where it
was celebrated, notwithstanding that at the time thereof one
of the parties is subject to an inhibition against remarriage
imposed by the decree of divorce or by statute of the state
where a previous divorce was granted (In Re Sanders Estate
(Calif., 1957), 305 P. 2d 655; Packard v. Packard (Iowa,
1950) 45 N.W. 2d 269; Criss v. Industrial Commission, 348
Ill. 75, 18 N.E. 572; see annotations, 32 A.L.R. 1142, 51
A.L.R. 325; see generally People v. Woodley, 22 Cal. App.
674, 136 Pac. 312; Bauer v. Abrahams, 73 Colo. 509, 216
Pac. 259; Green v. McDowell, 210 Mo. App. 517, 242 S.W.
168; Dimpfel v. Wilson, 107 Md. 329, 68 Atl. 561; and
Goodwin v. Goodwin (N.Y.) 142 N.Y. Supp. 1102). Where
it was not the intention of the person under the disability
simply to avoid the law of the divorce state, and where he
intends to establish domicile in the marriage state, such marriage is valid and unassailable (Owen v. Owen, 178 Wise.
609, 190 N.W. 363). As stated in Harvey v. Oklahoma (Okla.,
1925), 298 Pac. 862, 51 A.L.R. 321:

" * * * It is generally held that the inhibition in a
decree of divorce has no extraterritorial effect, and is
enforceable only in the State where the divorce is
granted, and that outside of such State the marriage
is generally treated as valid, although there is some
division in the authorities.''
Also to the effect that a restraint on remarriage has no extraterritorial effect see Boyles v. Wallace, 208 Ala. 213, 93 So.
19
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908; Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N.Y. 313, 165 N.E. 460, 61 A.L.R.
1523; Yeats v. S. (Okla.), 236 Pac. 62; Plummer v. Davis
(Okla.), 36 P. 2d 938; and People v. Woodley, 22 Cal. App.
674, 136 Pac. 312, which also looked to the law of the place
of marriage to determine validity.
In Bauer v. Abrahams, supra, the Colorado Supreme Court
treated with a situation identical to the case at bar. In that
case a divorce was obtained in Kansas, which Decree provided
that the marriage was "dissolved," but "that the decree does
not become absolute and take effect until the expiration of six
months from said time." During the six-month period, a
marriage was consummated by one of the parties in New
Mexico, and the marriage was determined to be valid. And
being valid where consummated in New Mexico, it must be
given full force and effect everywhere (see Willey v. Willey,
22 Wash. 115, 60 Pac. 145).
In re Sanders (Calif. 1957) 305 P. 2d 655, a petition was
brought to remove an administrator of the estate on the ground
that the marriage of the administrator and deceased was void
because of a prior existing marriage. The marriage in question
had taken place while one party was under a disability imposed by a divorce obtained in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma
statute prohibited remarriage during a six-month interlocutory
period, and also provided that the decree would not take
effect until six months after the judgment. The California
court stated that the disabling features of the Oklahoma
statute had no extraterritorial effect; accordingly, the marriage
\vas valid where consummated outside of Oklahoma.
20
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In a 1950 decision, the Iowa Supreme Court construed the
following Kansas statute:
"Every decree of divorce shall recite the day and date
when the judgment was rendered in the cause, and that
the decree does not become absolute and take effect
until the expiration of six months from said time"
(Sec. 60-1514).
One of the parties to a Kansas divorce subject to and during
this disabling feature, remarried in Iowa. The Iowa court
held that when a person remarries during this period in another state where the marriage is not unlawful it will be
upheld as a legal marriage, viewing the prior marriage as dissolved when granted (Pickard v. Pickard, supra, citing
Wheelock v. Freiwald (8th Cir.) 66 F. 2d 694, 700).
The Illinois courts have subscribed to the doctrine that
extraterritorial effect will not be given to disabling periods in
divorce decrees. In Criss t'. Industrial Commission, 348 Ill.
75, 180 N.E. 572, the Illinois Supreme Court examined the
extraterritorial effect of an Alabama divorce decree which
provided that in no event was a party to the divorce to remarry
before the expiration of sixty days after the decree. In addition
the Alabama code provided that a decree without personal
service is not absolute for twelve months inasmuch as the
divorce can be set aside within that period should the defaulted
defendant discover the divorce. The Illinois court held that
the presumption was in favor of the validity of a marriage
consummated in Illinois a few days after the Alabama decree
of divorce was granted, as the marriage was not prohibited
by Illinois Jaw. The Illinois Supreme Court further observed
that unless the prohibition upon remarriage was expressly
21
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prohibitive of remarriage in another state, the remarriage
provision applied only in Alabama.
And in Van Voorhis v. Brinthall, 86 N. Y. 18, 40 Am.
Rep. 505, it was held that although a decree of divorce granted
in New York forbade remarriage of the husband, the children
of his subsequent marriage celebrated in another state where
it was valid were legitimate in New York although such
marriage would have been invalid if celebrated in New York.
The reluctance of courts to give extraterritorial effect to
such proscription, is because of the strong public policy in
favor of the validity of marriage (see Note, 26 Harvard Law
Review 536). Professor Joseph H. Beale, in an article entitled
Marriage and the Domicile, in 54 Harvard Law Review 501,
writes concerning prohibition upon remarriage, at 517:

" * * * But the application of this injunction to a
marriage contracted abroad would result in the bastardization of its issue as well as in a declaration that
the parties are living in a state of concubinage. This
Pyrrhic victory can hardly justify the common law in
classing these unions with incest and polygamy, and
the courts have usually so held when faced with the
question."
The evidence tending to show a proscription against remarriage and postponing the effective date of the decree would
not be sufficient in the instant case, as a matter of law, to rebut
the presumption of the validity of the second marriage. By
any fair and sensible construction, the German divorce decree
presents an ambiguous result. In the first instance, the divorce
is clearly terminated when granted by the language of the
decree; thereafter, the effective date of the divorce is postponed.
22
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The postponement reasonably can be explained as a method
to preserve an appeal, a social effort to discourage divorce
actions followed by hasty remarriages, or a cooling off period
intended to reconcile the parties. Moreover, under any construction, it is doubted that the couple could cohabit together
during the interlocutory period.
To decline to give extraterritorial effect to the interlocutory
period of the German decree can only be consonent with wholesome public policy. This Honorable Court can restore to Lore
Popp the cloak of legitimacy and honor which was stripped
from her by the trial court against the evidence and the law,
and this laudable action would be in conformity with the
great majority of state decisions upon the subject. Such a
result would also save plaintiff from the stigma of having
committed the crimes of bigamy and unlawful cohabitation,
not to mention the legitimacy of the second child born to
plaintiff and Winifred Popp.
D. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO ONLY, THAT
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY THE PARTIES IN ILLINOIS WAS VOID, THE STATUS OF
THE MINOR CHILD IS LEGITIMATE WITHIN
THE MEANINGS OF ILLINOIS STATUTES AND
BY REASON OF PUBLIC POLICY.
Two Illinois statutes, when construed jointly, would
assure the legitimacy of the minor child even though it were
concluded, as a matter of law, that the marriage ceremony at
Peoria, Illinois, was of no lawful effect.
As indicated hereinabove, Chapter 3, Section 163, Ill.
23
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Rev. Stat., 1953, considers a child legitimate where the parents
intermarry and is acknowledged by the father as the father's
child. Chapter 89, Section 17a, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953, provides
in substance that where two parties have attempted by a lawful
form of marriage ceremony in apparent compliance with law
to be joined in marriage and cohabit together as husband and
wife, and there is issue born of such cohabitation, issue is
legitimate although the attempted marriage is declared void
or might be declared void.
Reading these statutes together, and applying their spirit
and meaning to the instant case, assuming the marriage to be
void or voidable, it would be consistent with public policy
to treat the child, Lore, as legitimate. In a sense she is issue
of a marriage, though the marriage was celebrated subsequent
to her birth. And she is legitimate for all purposes, including
the requirement that the consent of the plaintiff be secured
to any contemplated adoption of the child in Utah.
This result is wholesome and saves the child from the
stigma of bastardy and the errors of the parents. Being
remedial, the legitimation statutes are ordinarily construed
liberally by the courts (see Note, Status of Issue of Void
Marriages, 56 Harvard Law Review 624).

POINT II
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF IS A FIT AND
PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE CONTROL AND CUSTODY OF HIS MINOR CHILD, LORE POPP.
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Viewing all the competent evidence in a light most favorable to defendants, it is submitted as a matter of law that
the plaintiff is a fit and proper person to have the custody
of his minor child, Lore Popp.
At the first hearing on this matter before the trial court,
Winifred testified in substance that plaintiff had upon occasion
struck the child, and had manifested rather strict parental
discipline and control over the child. It is apparent from her
testimony that she was biased and only justifying her calloused
act of placing the child for adoption. The testimony of the
sister of Winifred, Lydia Fleischman, (R. 168-183) hardly
bolsters the testimony of Winifred, as Lydia's contacts with
plaintiff and Winifred were too infrequent and the basis for
her observations too speculative and remote.
The plaintiff testified convincingly that he loved his child
dearly and wanted to return with her to Peoria. His testimony
that he treated the child fairly and with every consideration
for her health, welfare and happiness is credible, honest and
forthright. That he exhibited a disciplinary attitude and
required obedience is not to say that he was unfit or immoral.
As a general proposition, the legal right of a fit and
suitable parent to the custody of his child ought not to be
denied him as against an opposing claimant having no legal
right to the child (Sherry v. Doyle, 68 Utah 74, 249 Pac.
250, 48 A.L.R. 131). As pointed out by this Honorable Court
in Sherry v. Doyle, supra, " * * * it may well be presumed that
the care and custody of a child, and its interest and welfare,
will best be subserved under the control of the parent." In
the same opinion it was further observed:
25
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"Unless the plaintiff is immoral or unfit, such association and companionship of the father and the child
is the right of both and ought not to be denied to
either. The comforts and benefits of such an association
with one of the child's own flesh and blood usually are
far more advantageous than an association with strangers."
There is nothing in the record to show that the child's
mental, moral, or physical welfare or her future happiness
or development will be adversely affected by favoring the
father in this regard (Baldwin v. Nielson, (Utah, 1946) 174
P. 2d 437; cf. Walton v. Coffman (Utah, 1946) 169 P. 2d 97).

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff rightfully
and lawfully is entitled to the custody of his minor child,
Lore Popp, against the defendants who have no daim to custody; and that plaintiff, as the natural father, is a fit and
proper person to have the care, control and custody of his
said child.

Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM G. FOWLER
Counsel for Appellant
628 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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